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Abstract 
In 2005, Madagascar embarked on a major land reform whose foundation is inter alia based on the 
establishment of new decentralized land administration operated by the Communes: the Local Land 
Office (LLO or Guichets Fonciers). Upon its establishment, the LLO is facing three main challenges: 
its effective management and valuation by local authorities, its ownership by the population, and over 
all its financial sustainability. Six years after the first LLO was inaugurated, the overall statement 
depicts mixed statuses related to their performances, ownership by local stakeholders and 
perpetuation. This paper aims at highlighting the determinants that could influence the upholding of 
these Local Land Offices as well as the quality of their operation, and targets to unravel key conditions 
towards their sustainability. On the basis of a set of in-depth studies and field experiences conducted 
by the Malagasy Land Observatory on LLO and local governance, the paper uses a general assessment 
covering more than 300 Communes in 2012. The paper delineates the stakes and challenges related to 
the decentralization of land management and the institution of LLO. It compares the local context, the 
operating conditions and the social interactions of 3 groups of LLO according to their upholding 
pathways. 
Keywords: autonomy, Communes, governance, Local Land Offices, Madagascar 
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1. The Local land office: background and rationale  
1.1. Reshuffling the legal foundations of land rights  
Legal pluralism and the dual concepts of customary and modern land rights, particularly the « tanim – 
panjakana »1, were always present in Madagascar’s history since the royalty period. Over the 
centuries, their gain on legitimacy had evolved between the two sides, the local and the central. The 
land reform in 2005, acknowledging local practices in terms of land rights management, has moved 
the cursor towards the legitimation of the lex loci.  
The reform has brought key innovations in terms of legal and institutionnal shifts. The first change 
addressed the abandonment of the principle of state property (domanialty) presumption on customarily 
occupied land. The Law 2005 – 019 brought a new definition and structured the legal statutes of land 
tenures. Henceforth, any occupation on land not titled and legitimized by the community is 
acknowledged belonging to private property. The Law 2006 – 031 transfers the legal competence of 
the management of the now – called “Non – Titled Private Property” from the state land 
administration to the Communes, provided that a Local Land Office (LLO or “Guichets Fonciers”) is 
set – up. A new document warranting full property rights, the Land Certificate (“Certificats Foncier” 
or “Kara – tany” in Malagasy), is issued at the end of a process based on the local recognition of the 
requestor’s rights by the communities and the local authorities.  
Beyond the empowerment of the mayor to issue legal document, decentralization of land management 
spans all aspects regarding the customary land rights formalization and transfers some of the central 
prerogatives to local institutions. Thus, the Municipal Council is enabled to emit a legal decision (the 
“sentence arbitrale” or arbitration award) pertaining to conflits and claims in the process of land 
certification. A democratic Local Recognition Committee constituted by the raiamandreny (traditional 
leaders, elders), the Chief of Fokontany (village), a representative of the municipal administration, and 
the neighbouring community, is in charge of attesting the validity of the requestor claimed rights and 
performs mediation in case of claimants’ opposition. 
1.2. Conciliating customary rights formalization and technology 
The process of land management decentralization has brought on board the use of new technology. In 
interrelation with the empowerment of local institutions and practice, the land certification procedure 
is all built around the use of the PLOF or Local Land Occupancy Map (Plan Local d’Occupation 
Foncière). The PLOF is a GIS-based tool constituted of a satellite or aerial background imagery on 
which is overlayed the delimitation of existing land titles, which were beforehand digitized and their 
geographic coordinates assigned. This proceeding will allow first to demarcate the areas of 
competence of the LLO, provided land certificate cannot overlap on previously established land titles. 
                                               
1
 Literally: the land of the Fanjakana, the State. Prior to the colonization, this term referred to the absolute rights 
of property of the King or the Queen on all land within the kingdom territory. From 1896, the meaning has been 
translated to the domaniality and the absolute rights of colonial administration. In the aftermath of the 
declaration of independance (1960), the principle of domaniality presumption has been remaining until 2005.   
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On the second hand, using visual reference points or lines such as roads, trails, streams, makes the 
identification and the demarcation of the requested plot limits easier on the map. 
The introduction of this costly technology has influenced the capacity of Communes to access to LLO. 
Indeed, acquisition of satellite imagery may cost from 35 to 50 USD per square kilometer. 
Considering that the average size of a Malagasy rural Commune approximates 150 square kilometer, 
the sole acquisition of the PLOF (satellite imagery acquisition, land titles digitization and overlaying) 
amounts 7,000 USD.  
Moreover, its use requires a computer and the existence of an electricity source, which is only the case 
of 10 % of Malagasy Communes.  
1.3. The National Land Program 
Beyond the renovation of legal texts, the decentralization of the land management through the 
establishment of local land offices has become a specific countrywide program in the scope of the 
National Land Program (PNF, Programme National Foncier). From 2006 to 2011, setting – up LLO 
has benefitted up to 25 millions USD with the contribution of thirteen major donors (Andrianirina – 
Ratsialonana et al., 2011). By the end of 2012, more than 460 LLOs were created throughout the 
Malagasy territory (representing one – forth of the national territory), of which 97 % were supported 
by external donors. The establishment of the remaining 3 % has been either self – funded by the 
Commune, supported by the administrative Region or by the state land administration (Andrianirina – 
Ratsialonana, 2009 b).  
International aid combined with often systematic certification operations, motivated by the objective 
of massive land security, fostered the issuance of more than 90,000 land certificates – out of 170,000 
requests – by the end of 2012 (figures 2 and 3).  
Categories of financial support that LLO may benefit from external funding include: 
— funding for initial investments : building of the LLO office (often set – up apart from the 
Commune main office), desktop computers, PLOF, office furnitures, means of transportation 
(motorcycle, bicycle),  
— initial training of municipal staff (LLO, mayor, local recognition committee) and periodic 
tutoring on activities management, 
— the operation cost for a certain period (usually two years): agents wages, motorcycle fuel, 
office supplies, other charges (electricity cosumption), etc. 
The overall investment cost to set – up a LLO may amount from 8,000 USD up to 30,000 USD while 
annual operation cost comes to 2,000 USD. These figures may seem disproportionate compared to the 
annual operating budget of a medium – sized Commune which totalizes approximately 3,000 USD.  
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1.4. The land certification process 
Depending upon the existence of electricity sources, there are two types of LLOs. The first is the 
computerized LLO which is supplied with IT equipment (computer, printer, and scanner). The LLO is 
independently operated by the Commune. The second type is called the “paper” LLO, for the 
Communes which are not electrically powered. Five to ten neighboring paper LLOs, constituting an 
OPCI (inter - municipal cooperation public body) are structured around a CRIF (land information and 
resources center). The CRIF is a computerized Commune which is performing the entire land 
certificates edition, from demarcated plot digitization to land certificate printing. Paper LLOs 
operation is not then autonomous (Andrianirina – Ratsialonana, 2009 a).  
Two key local stakeholders are playing parts in the land certification process: the Commune 
administrative staff and the Local Recogintion Committee (see section 1.1). The LLO agent manages 
all the technical certification process, from request registration to land certificate issuance. GIS – 
trained, he is in charge of storing the land certificates digital database. The mayor is the official 
authority signing the land certificate.  
2. The international aid aftermath  
2.1. The 2009 political crisis: the unexpected early handover? 
When supporting the creation of a LLO, the donor or its implementing entity often sets a 
memorandum of understanding, describing the terms of collaboration with the Commune. The 
duration of the assistance is often set to two years, after which the Commune is supposed to take over 
all the operating cost. Sometimes, an extension period is granted when statement is made that the 
Commune is not yet ready to independently manage the LLO activities. 
In March 2009, a political coup ousting the democratically elected president Marc Ravalomanana led 
to a transition government which was not acknowledged by the international community. When land 
reform key donors withdrew their resources, more than 300 LLOs created between 2008 and 2009 
were suddenly left without assistance (see table in figure 1 below). 
 
Year Number of new 
LLO created  
LLO cumulative 
number 
2006 13 13 
2007 24 37 
2008 198 235 
2009 109 344 
2010 39 383 
2011 30 413 
2012 49 465 
Figure.1 Evolution of the number of LLOs (source: land observatory). Peaks of LLOs created are 
displayed in 2008 and 2009. 
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2.2. The paradox of crisis and LLO maintenance 
The donors’ withdrawal mainly impacted the Communes autonomy – gaining slow process. Without 
an effective handover strategy, the sudden cut – off had adverse consequences for the communes that 
were used to external support: 
— Incompleteness of training sessions leading to uncertain skills for local stakeholders (mayor, 
LLO agents, fokontany chiefs, CRL). Mastering new skills related to the decentralized land 
management tools, documents and procedures required hours of apprenticeship that had not 
been completed. This deficiency may lead to some erratic procedures, legal irrelevancies or 
abuses that could undermine property rights recognition. 
— Issues on financial sustainability – The suddenness of the suspension of financial support 
meant that the LLOs takeover issues had not yet truly been addressed. No strategies had yet 
been established to take charge and extend the LLO operation, and on a mid – term 
perspective to link property formalization and land taxation. 
— Uncertainty regading the continuum of the formalized rights and the conservation of the 
already – registered land certificates. The questions of the competence related to the 
management and the afterhand operations of the property rights documents once the LLO 
closes – out are raised. Will be they handed to the state land services legal competence or 
transmitted under the neighbor LLO continuation? 
— Risks of social troubles. At the social level, the shortened operation period and then the LLO 
closing – out had restrained hundreds of land certificate requests. This situation in some areas 
had worsened land – related tensions and fostered a social destabilization related to the 
apprehension of land grabbing maneuvers from the local elite. 
However, contrary to lots of development projects in countries used to rationale and temporality of 
international aid (Birschenk et al, 2000), the decentralization of land management in Madagascar did 
not end in a general failure in this context of limited financial support. Paradoxically, the interruption 
of external support seemed to induce common reaction to the local rulers: a determination to keep the 
LLO running and maintain its agents on staff, without however the ability to financially fully ensure 
its operation. As best as they can, the Communes had developed “emergency” strategies to cover the 
operation costs, primarily with the revenue earned from land certification. While some LLOs doubled 
or tripled the price of land certificates overnight, others preferred to lay off an agent. 
The national assessment conducted by the National Land Program in 2012 reported that:  
- 11 % of LLOs succeeded in self – funding: the Communes proper resources are consequent 
enough to balance expenditures costs.  
- 22 % are in the process of being autonomous: their annual budget would allow taking charge 
of operation cost provided internal revenues (such as land tax) are efficiently managed. 
 Despite their scarce financial resources, agents are still maintained on duty. Thus, these offices 
continue to satisfy to users’ information requests and to issue land certificates; even if 
formalization requests, in most of the communes, are quite limited.
- 56 % are « on struggle
expenditure costs. Land certificate
periphery of the Commune center
- 11 % did definitely close 
Do these facts illustrate a somehow 
governance?  The paper aims to analyze what factors explain the upholding of local land offices. It 
successively explores throughout (i) the role of the local 
(iii) its strategies and interactions with the population and the local authorities.
 
Figure 2: evolution of the numbers of request and land certificates issued
(source: Land Observatory, National Land Program)
 
 »: resources availability is seasonal and the LLOs 
s issuance is sporadic and is most of the time limited in the 
. 
– out. Most of the time, the LLO agents resigned. 
hopeful integration of the local land offices in the local land 
environment; (ii) the land office’s assets and 
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Figure 3: National distribution of Communes with Local land offices (source: Malagasy Land 
Observatory – March 2013) 
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3. Assessing LLO integration and effectiveness  
3.1. Defining ranking criteria 
Assessing the integration of the LLO within the local governance has not benefitted from a 
standardized approach or a commonly accepted mehodology. Since the local experiences vary from 
one country to another, the exercise and the appreciation may then appear subjective. In the scope of 
this paper, the assessment of the effectiveness and the integration within the Communes institutionnal 
and social contexts is taking into account two categorization criteria : 
• The first is looking at the level of ownership at social (formalized land security need), 
institutionnal (interaction and balance of powers regarding the local stakeholders : municipal 
authorities, customary leaders, communities), political, and administrative (availability of 
budget) stages, 
• The second adresses the management skill regarding the LLO and its operation, adressing the 
accuracy in procedure enforcement and land certification processing, as well as its 
management optimization. 
3.2. Background materials and analysis sources 
The data used to perform the hereby analysis were streamed from four sources :  
- The Malagasy Land Observatory database. In the scope of its mandate to generate relevant 
information aiming at shaping up land policy and monitoring the Malagasy land reform 
implementation, the Land Observatory is managing a comprehensive database on land 
certificates request and issuance.   
- The Communes – LLO fact sheets. These sheets, filled in the scope of the general assessment 
conducted by the PNF in 2012, contain all the most relevant key data on the Commune and the 
LLO (Commune surface, date of LLO establishment, duration of technical tutoring, land title 
coverage, number of population, distance from the main road, annual budget, etc.).  
- Qualitative surveys conducted by the Land Observatory in four Communes in 2012, aiming at 
enlighting the role of the LLO in local governance (Boisard and Fanjaniaina, forthcoming). 
These surveys allowed inter alia to feature the adjustments of the LLOs to local contexts and 
cicumstances related to their integration within the Commune, their operation, their human 
and financial resources or their conflict management. 
- World Bank survey 2004 - 2005. External factors are measured through variables on 
macroeconomic and demographic contexts of the Commune. Part of the data comes from the 
Commune database developped from the survey supported by the World Bank in 2004 - 2005 
(population, area). 
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The analysis consisted in assigning for each Commune an average score for each used variable (each 
category of hypothesis factor contains many variables). It is then refined using multinomial logistic 
regressions, which are to determine the factors affecting the probability of belonging to each category 
compared to others (Mc Fadden, 1993). 
3.3. Three key determinants at stakes  
The experience of decentralizing land management is quite recent globally and in the African 
continent. Few assessment findings have been made available, especially in Africa (Toulmin, 2009; 
Lavigne Delville, 1998). Authors such as Shah have tried to classify the determinants of success of 
decentralization on other issues such as property tax, distinguishing interactions at political, 
bureaucratic, institutional and external stakeholders levels (Shah, 2006). Given this methodology 
availability constraint, the hypotheses tested to identify the determinants of maintenance of Local land 
offices arise from empirical statements and field experiences, enriched with previous assessments of 
decentralized land management (Teyssier et al., 2009; Comby et al., 2011). 
All the causal factors that have been identified at all the levels have been put together within three key 
determinants:  
— the LLO local context including the environment of the Commune: demographic, geographic, 
political and institutional, 
— the LLO operating conditions : staff size, availability of equipments (printer, computers, 
PLOF, etc.), financial supports,  
— the strategies and interactions with the local population, including the impacts and outreach of 
communication campaign, the ownership of the LLO, the social perception of land security, 
the balance of power between customary and administrative authorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: interaction of the three determinants of LLO sustainability 
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3.4. The LLO local contexts 
The demographic context 
The hypothesis of a "massive demand for land security" is the origin of the Malagasy land reform 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 2005). Indeed, in the classical registration process inspired Torrens system, 
the coverage rate titles is very low unless the pace of issuing new securities may not be accelerated 
efficiently, particularly in rural areas (Teyssier et al., 2009).  
Titling is rare: thes costs are high and procedures are long. On the other hand, people – mainly the 
rural – frequently use the “petits papiers”2 to secure their rights: In this context, the installation of the 
Land Offices has aimed to respond more quickly to this demand at a lower cost through local 
institutions as for some African countries (Deininger et al., 2007). 
Assuming that the pressure on land is more important and it is likely that the need for formalization is 
also stronger, the population in a given commune can be a variable for estimating the pressure on land 
and the potential demand for land certificate at the Commune. 
The geographic situation : remoteness 
The accessibility of the Commune can play in different ways on the need for a local institution for 
regulating land management. 
Improved physical accessibility of the Commune promotes trade and economic development. Revenue 
opportunities are often broader (eg. local taxes on weekly markets) for both the Commune and its 
citizens. 
Political and institutional contexts 
All installed LLOs are subject to the same political context at the macro level. However, differences 
on local institutional contexts may cause variations in their respective pathways.  
Indeed, the importance and role of customary authorities may vary from one region to another. On the 
other hand, the existence of other recognized types of formalization (both written and unwritten) can 
complexify the existing institutional equilibrium (Deininger et al., 2008; Colin et al., 2009), or even 
slow down or stop the adoption of the land certificate and involve mistrust or rejection of the newly 
implanted institution. 
3.5. The LLO operating conditions 
At the beginning, the Land Offices were created on a common thread, with precise technical and 
operational procedures and guidelines. Local context, however, have changed their operating 
conditions, with tailored adaptations, mainly in the management of human and material resources. 
                                               
2
 The “petits papiers” are handwritten documents accompanying transactions (sale, inheritance and 
donation), tax receipts (Burnod et al., 2012). They offer a first formalization of rights or more exactly, 
an “informal formalization of rights” (Mathieu, 2001). 
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Actually, in the decentralization context, these resources and skills can be highly diversified from a 
Commune to another.  
The staff constituency 
The staff size: at the beginning of the reform, a large majority of LLOs were equipped with 2 agents or 
more. Later, many of the Communes reduced the staff, either by withdrawal of an agent due to the 
instability of earnings, either due to financial constraints of the Commune. The evolution of the 
number of agents can be seen as an adaptation phenomenon (chosen or induced). 
The duties of the LLO agents: the original LLO is an office whose main function was land 
certification. Later, however, along with the gradual integration in the municipal staff, some 
Communes have expanded the function of LLO agents beyond certification. They can work on part-
time in the civil service, the Secretariat of the Town Hall, the fiscal services, or in other various 
technical services, animation, etc. This broadening of functions may be an indicator of integration in 
the Commune insofar the main activities of the LLO are properly insured. 
Equipments 
Computerization can be an essential factor on upholding the LLO: a non – computerized (paper) LLO 
may have a lower cost of operation and can be easily maintained by a rather ordinary Commune. 
However, a computerized one is more autonomous, their activity requires less travel and the 
Commune may be more likely to maintain its activity for the various municipal services their 
equipments could be used for. 
Financial support 
The take-off of the land reform and the implementation of Land Offices were accompanied by a 
considerable amount of technical and financial support. The first successful experiences are probably 
the direct effect of this massive injection of resources. The aftermath of the withdrawal of major 
donors mainly gave place to a divergence of LLO pathways, differentiating “integrated” LLOs and 
“rejected grafts” (Andrianirina - Ratsialonana, 2009 b). 
Later, some Communes have implemented new funding systems with other donors or through their 
own funds. Indeed, the weakness of the demand – and the initial prices of certificates - do not often 
allow this sole operation to guarantee the functioning of the office (Comby et al., 2011). The nature of 
financial support can be a major determinant in maintaining Land Offices as they encourage their 
creation and / or upholding. 
3.6. Strategies and interactions with local population 
Information was one of the major watchwords of the activity of Land Offices at their beginning. The 
evaluation of the first Land Offices had already highlighted the issues of regular information 
campaigns, accurate and "closer to the people" (Brochard et al., 2008). Indeed, relations with the local 
population are a crucial element of ownership of the LLO within communities. 
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The ownership has also been evaluated in the context of the investigation of the PNF. It is shifted from 
a system of indicators including the functions of the mayor and municipal staff. The aggregated 
indicator of this appropriation is also included in the analysis, differentiating "good" and "correct" 
appropriations from the other levels of evaluated appropriation. 
Promotional operations called "KTM" (Kara – tany Malaky, rapid land certificate) - consisting of 
information campaigns and intensive communication, followed by waves of certifications -, have been 
widely implemented at the beginning of the decentralization of land management. The lack of 
financial support has considerably weakened these information operations after the start of the crisis, 
resulting in a possible reduction of the perception of usefulness of LLOs by users and local authorities.  
On the other hand, high demand rates in 2008 – 2009 generated saturations in the LLO activity after 
the withdrawal of external funding. Later, some LLOs have adapted their strategies to their capabilities 
and resources - human, material and financial - in order to ensure a proper operation of the different 
certification steps. For instance, some of them define periods of application, resulting in economies of 
scale. The delivery rate of certificates, measured from the average annual number of issued certificates 
is integrated as an explanatory variable for the analysis. 
Requests and land certification rates were used as characteistics variables regarding level of 
interactions between LLO and the local population. 
4. Discussions and conclusions 
4.1. LLO Category differentiating factors 
The table below (Table 6) represents the differentiation between LLO categories regarding the 
three factors classes A, B and C. 
Table 6: Differentiation between LLO categories 
 
Significance level : * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%  
 A B C
operati onal on s truggle Total (ac tiv e )
Local c ont ext
P opula tion 20,150      19,711      19,950       20,884          20,269       
Remoteness to t he  District (hours) 2.5           4.8           3.5             4.7                3.9             *
O the r  land statute s (relative  importance) 34% 38% 36% 24% 32% **
LLO opera ting conditions
Sta ff size ( initial) 1.8           2.0           1.9             1.9                1.9             
Sta ff size (2012) 1.0           1.0           1.0             1.0                1.0             
Equipment (compute rs) 34% 12% 24% 15% 21% **
Equipment (orthophotos) 79% 92% 85% 74% 81% **
D onors
  M CA until 2009 34% 75% 53% 67% 58% **
  M CA and/then  other don ors 2% 6% 4% 2% 3%
  O the r donors 54% 15% 36% 24% 32% **
  Financ ial autonomy 10% 4% 7% 7% 7%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Strategie s and inte rac tions with  the local  population
O wne rship (P N F scoring) 91% 51% 73% 29% 58% ***
K TM 70% 88% 80% 81% 80%
P ayment fa cilitie s (number of payments) 1.8           1.9           1.8             2.0                1.9             **
CF de live ry ra te s 32            50            40              36                 39              
To tal
( inac tiv e  LLO)
active  LLO
T otal (active  
and inac tiv e )
Mean difference tes t 
betwee n active and  
inactive LLO
LLO category
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Table 7: Multinomial logit regressions outputs 
 
Significance level : ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
4.2.Is the local context critical for the upholding of the LLO ? 
Table 6 clearly shows that remoteness plays a major role on LLO’s upholding pathways (3.5 hours 
drive on average to the center of the District for active LLOs and 4.7 hours for inactive LLOs). 
However, the most distant LLOs are more difficult to maintain (category B). The outlined hypothesis 
is confirmed in the sense that these towns are also the least financially endowed, due to a less 
integrated economy. In addition, remoteness to the Classical Land Administration Offices (“Services 
Fonciers”) makes difficult and expensive the potential data, information or skill interactions.  
The specific activity of LLO placed in accessible Communes can also be explained by a potentially 
higher land pressure, mainly for plots nearby roads. 
 C oe f. Std. ErrorP  > |z| Coe f. Std. Error P > |z| Coef. Std. Error P > |z|
Remoteness 0.029 -  0.039   0.025 -  0.037   
Obsolete status (relative presence) 0.890 -  0.451   ** 0.401   0.421   
Staff size (initial) 0.301   0.512   0.384   0.546   
Staff size (2012) 1.397 -  1.431   0.777   1.516   
Equipment (computers ) 1.132   0.480   ** 0.473   0.515   
Equipment (orthophoto) 1.127 -  0.768   1.073 -  0.754   
Donor: MCA until 2009 1.978   1.171   1.016 -  1.214   
Donor: other donors 3.812   1.214   *** 0.026 -  1.168   
Donor: financial autonomy 2.450   1.438   0.787 -  1.441   
Ownership (PN F scoring) 1.514   0.574   *** 2.645   0.526   ***
Payment facilities 0.533 -  0.382   0.724 -  0.374   
CF delivery rate 0.008 -  0.003   ** 0.001 -  0.004   
Remoteness 0.029   0.039   0.005   0.024   
Obsolete status (relative presence) 0.890   0.451   ** 1.291   0.447   ***
Staff size (initial) 0.301 -  0.512   0.083   0.612   
Staff size (2012) 1.397   1.431   2.174   1.270   
Equipment (computers ) 1.132 -  0.480   ** 0.659 -  0.551   
Equipment (orthophoto) 1.127   0.768   0.054   0.919   
Donor: MCA until 2009 1.978 -  1.171   2.993 -  0.900   ***
Donor: other donors 3.812 -  1.214   *** 3.838 -  1.001   ***
Donor: financial autonomy 2.450 -  1.438   3.237 -  1.235   ***
Ownership (PN F scoring) 1.514 -  0.574   *** 1.131   0.451   **
Payment facilities 0.533   0.382   0.192 -  0.380   
CF delivery rate 0.008   0.003   ** 0.007   0.004   
Remoteness 0.025   0.037   0.005 -  0.024   
Obsolete status (relative presence) 0.401 -  0.421   1.291 -  0.447   ***
Staff size (initial) 0.384 -  0.546   0.083 -  0.612   
Staff size (2012) 0.777 -  1.516   2.174 -  1.270   
Equipment (computers ) 0.473 -  0.515   0.659   0.551   
Equipment (orthophoto) 1.073   0.754   0.054 -  0.919   
Donor: MCA until 2009 1.016   1.214   2.993   0.900   ***
Donor: other donors 0.026   1.168   3.838   1.001   ***
Donor: financial autonomy 0.787   1.441   3.237   1.235   ***
Ownership (PN F scoring) 2.645 -  0.526   *** 1.131 -  0.451   **
Payment facilities 0.724   0.374   0.192   0.380   
CF delivery rate 0.001   0.004   0.007 -  0.004   
Log pseudolikelihood
Prob > chi2
Pseudo  R2
Variable
A
 
: 
O
PE
R
A
T
IO
N
A
L
B
 
: 
O
N
 
ST
R
U
G
G
L
E
C
 
: 
IN
A
C
T
IV
E
refe re nce clus te r: A refe re nce  clus ter: B reference cluste r: C
186 .470  -            
0. 0000    
0 .385                  
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The isolation is thus a criterion disabling the Communes willing to establish a LLO. 
The relative preponderance of land burdened with obsolete or non-certifiable land status characterizes 
the “on struggle" LLOs (see Table 7). A local context characterized by a multiplicity of land 
formalization systems seems to boost the need for a local land administration, although it hardly 
fulfills its functions. 
Thus, the results corroborate the hypothesis according to which potential land pressure - estimated 
using the degree of isolation and multiple forms of right formalization, effectively contributes to the 
maintenance of the land office as a local administration office. We will see in the following results that 
the importance of financial resources and their management also affect the upholding pathways of the 
LLOs and their ability to ensure their operation. 
4.3. Is self-reliance a pathway to sustainability? 
Computer equipment is a dual purpose for LLOs : on one hand they free LLOs from editing and 
publishing services for land certificates. On the other hand, they allow them to use advanced mapping 
tools. Twelve percent of the “struggling” LLOs are computerized, versus 34% of fully operational 
ones and 15% of inactive ones (Table 6). Computerization and equipment in general, seem to benefit 
the achievement of autonomy for local land administration. 
As a part of the Commune, the operating budget of the LLO is strongly linked to the Commune’s. 
Differentiation between "autonomous" and "on struggle" LLOs is partly explained by the nature of the 
financial support they received at the beginning of their activity as well as during the crisis period. 
Table 7 shows that a few LLO among those initially supported by the MCA found later financing. 
LLOs created with multiple donors are currently the most autonomous. The withdrawal of financial 
partners has been a major turning point in the pathway of the LLO. Multiple partnerships seem to be 
the best guarantee of sustainability. 
Qualitative field works also highlighted that a several LLO conducted actions to strengthen the 
financial capital through the revision of certification costs in order to ensure related expenses. Others 
prospected for alternative funding. Indeed, the financial balance of a LLO is rarely offset by the 
exclusive revenue from certification procedures (Boisard and Fanjaniaina, 2012). 
This last remark refers to the intrinsic worth on the establishment of local land offices: compared to 
other activities of the Commune, it is quite possible that they are not directly cost-effective and may 
cause additional charges. By cons, if we consider that this is a useful service to the public, its 
maintenance is no longer a simple economic calculation; other relevant factors matter as outlined in 
the following section. 
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4.4. LLO upholding decision: further than an internal economic logic 
The above results show that the local context affects the sustainability of a LLO, while some economic 
factors are constraints that affect their operation ("autonomous/ fully operational" Vs "on struggle" in 
particular). 
Though, the LLO of group"C" are sometimes characterized by a more favorable profile than those of 
LLO that still active, but on struggle ("B"). Profiles and activity level does not follow a strictly linear 
trend. 
Ownership of LLO by the Commune is a major determinant for its upholding (see Tables 6 and 7). It 
is an indicator based on (i) the knowledge of the Mayor on his duties, (ii) his level of involvement and 
that of his staff in the activities of LLO and (iii) variables on their perceptions on the usefulness of the 
LLO. Thus, beyond the measurable determinants, other subjective factors act in parallel on the ability 
of LLO to sustain. Qualitative investigations in 3 Communes conducted with The Malagasy land 
Observatory in 2012 were also used to refine the understanding of the roles and the integration of 
LLOs into the local dynamics. 
It is thus observed that, on one hand, other activities of the LLO contribute to the perception of tenure 
security. These roles are often hidden in conventional assessments. Indeed, LLO are frequently called 
upon by citizens on tenure security concerns: concrete understanding of rights on land, roles of other 
institutions dealing with land, etc.. LLO agents are also asked for referral in case of land conflicts. 
Finally, although still rare, some LLOs are preparing tools to facilitate the fiscal census for the 
Commune (Boisard and Fanjaniaina, 2012). These and many functions can be set up spontaneously, 
following a design of a versatile LLO supported by Comby et al. (Comby et al., 2011). In this context, 
the LLO justify by its functions, its usefulness and its integration to the Commune.  
4.5.Conclusion 
In 2005, Madagascar embarked on a major unprecedented land reform whose foundation is based on 
the abandonment of the principle of domaniality, the recognition and the opportunity to formalize 
customary land rights arising from long – term occupation, and the establishment of new decentralized 
land administration operated by the Communes: the Local Land Offices (LLO or Guichets Fonciers). 
Upon its establishment, the LLO is facing three main challenges: its effective management and 
valuation by local authorities, its ownership by the local population, and over all its financial 
sustainability. Due to the needs of the institutional and technical empowerment, as well as the high 
cost required when setting – up a LLO, foreign and international donors supported the technical and 
financial assistance including the start – up investment and the operation cost for he majority of them 
(up to 97 %). The attendance period was generally set for two years, after which a handover strategy 
had to be implemented. This situation of dependence had fostered a general disturbance when the 
political coup in March 2009 triggered the withdrawal of international aids, leaving the Communes 
with half – completed skills transfer and scarce internal resources to pull through.    
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This paper synthesizes the cumulative findings from the Land observatory works, enriched with an in 
– depth focus conducted in 2012 in four Communes regarding the interaction between the LLO and 
local governance. Six years after the first LLO was inaugurated, the overall statement depicts mixed 
statuses related to their performance, ownership by local stakeholders, and operation continuation. A 
general assessment done by the LNP covering more than 300 Communes in 2012 stated that 11 % of 
LLOs demonstrated full technical and financial capacity, 22 % are in progress towards a steady 
operation, 56 % are struggling to sustain whereas 11 % did close – out. 
Authors postulate that three joint factors would ease the integration of the LLO in the local 
governance. The ownership and maintenance are influenced by the Commune broader environment 
including social (demography, land pressure) and economic parameters (assets such as computers, 
multiple partnerships). Sustainability is also a matter of competence and dynamism of the Commune’s 
staff.  
Through the emphasis on the stakes and challenges related to the decentralization of land management 
to the Communes and the institution of LLO, the paper aims at contributing to provide 
recommendations on policymakerrs, donors and field practitioners. 
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